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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
ALFRED J. FOWERS, 
) Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. CASE 
DONALD GURNEY and !RETA F. i NO. 11,2'73 
) 
GURNEY, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
I 
APPELLANrs BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action on a Promissory Note and to For&-
close on a Mortgage on real property given to secure the 
Promissory Note. 
DISPOSITION IN WWER COURT 
'rhe Court rendered judgment on the Note and ordered 
the Mortgage foreclosed, but decreed that a deficiency 
Judgment would not be granted in this case because Don-
ald Gurney and Ireta F. Gurney, his wife, defendants, had 
bE>en dischaTged from this obligation . in bankruptcy. 
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REJ.IEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant see~ the reversal of 1Jhe judgment of the 
Lower Court against Appellant, Alfred J. Fowers, 
"That plaintiff be awarded no deficiency resulting 
from the sale because defendants have been disoharged ! 
of this obligation in bankruptcy." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Alfred J. Fowe.rs, on the 10th day of Novem· 
ber, 1965, filed a Complaint to forclose a Note and Mort· 
gage, a copy of the Note and Mortgage being attachd to 
the Complaint,. and on the same day filed a Lis Pendens 
with the Utah County Recorder's office. [)lonald Gurney 
and lreta F. Gurney, his wife, were seived with a S~ 
on the 18th day of November, 1965. 
Plaintiff brought this matter for hearing before the 
above entitled Court, the Honorable R. L. Tuckett, Judge, 
presiding, on the 14th day of December, 1965. On the 
14th day of December, 1965, the Mortgage was ordered 
foreclosed and rtJhe Note reduced to judgment. The Find· 
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Fore-
closure were signed and filed by the Honorable R. L. Tuck· 
ett, Judge, on the 23rd day of December, 1965. An Order 
of Sale was entered on the 27th day of December, 1965, 
and the property was originally Noticed for Sale on the 
20th day of Januacy, 1966, but said Notice was cancelled 
and the property was thereafter advertised in the Orem 
Geneva Times and was posted for sale on rtJhe 10th day of 
March, 1966. A Certificate of Sale Was thereafter duly 
returned to the Clerk of the Court showing that Alfred J. 
Fowera had purchased the property for $17 ,000.00 on March 
10, 1966. 
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Defendant, Donald Gurney, filed for Bankruptcy 
March 7, 1967. On March 20, 1967, Donald Gurney and 
Ireta F. Gwney, his wife, by and through their counsel, 
J. Robert Bullock, moved the Court for an Order declar-
ing the iDeficiency Judgment entered upon the judgment 
docKet in the records of this Court on or about March 10, 
1%6, in favor of plaintiff and' against defendants in the 
amount of $4,554.60 to be of no force and effect and in 
any event fully satisfied. 'l1he original motion was suppl~ 
mented on the 4th day of April, 1966, for the purpose of 
showing that the deficiency judgment entered in this ac-
tion on or about March 10, 1966, was satisfied by an oral 
fully executed, compromise agreement of the parties 
whereby plaintiff, Alfred J. Fowers, agreed to and did re-
instate the original indebtedness if defendants paid plain-
tiff's court costs and attorney's fees in the amount of 
$444.75, which court costs and attorney's fees were paid 
to plaintiff by defendants on or about August 26, 1966. The 
Motions were supplemented by Affidavits on file herein. 
On the 24th day of April, 1967, Alfred J. Fowers filed 
an Affidavit disclaiming any agreement but stated that he 
was willing to enter into a new contract with the defend-
ants on the same terms and conditions as the original Note 
and Mortgage if defendants paid a sufficient amount to 
comply with the original terms of the Note and Mortgage. 
A trial was had on May 9, 1967. On July 12, 1967, 
the Court made a Minute Entry stating: 
"The Court finds insufficient evidence to support 
an enforceable agreement between the parties which 
would affect the operation of the deficiency judgment. 
Defendants' motion is therefore denied." 
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On July 17, 1967, defendants filed a Motion to make 
Findings of Thct and Conclusions of Law and to Amend 
the Judgment and Decision. Plaintiff prepared Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law which the Colll"t reftmi 
to sign but filed the ~eon October 17, 1967. 
On 1lhe 24th day of October, 1967, the Court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclucions of Law and an Order 1 
based upon its Minute Entry dated October 18, 1967, where-
in the Cow-t st.at.eel: 
"Though the parties, by their affidavits, indicate 
a disagreement as to what they discussed and did or 
did not agree on in their telephone conversation in 
early Maroh, 1966, they each admit rthe conversation 
and admit to some type of agreement. 
Plaintiff's conduct thereafter would indicate that 
defendant's ~on is correct or that plaintiff is es-
topped to assert otJherwise. See Exhibit 1 (Letter 11· 
11-66); Exhibit 3 (copy, Cashier's Oheck); Account· 
ing Statement, 12- 13-66, Exhibit to affidavit filed 4· 
5-67. 
As between the parties, an accord may be reached ' 
varying the terms of a judgment. See 1 A.J.2nd 305, 
"Accord and Satisfiaction," section 6. The Court finds 
such to have OCCUITed here. Upon the resumption d 
payments and payment of attorney's fees by defend· 
ant, the note and mortgage were re-instated as betWefn 
the parties, and defendant's motion is therefore gran· 
ted.'' 
The Court concluded: 
"l. That the promissory note dated July 2, 1965, 
:In the amO\.lllt of $18,0000.00, which is the subject of 
the foreclosure action resulting in the deficiency judg· 
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ment ag~ defendants was, and is, reinstated pur-
suant to a complete, fully executed agreement of ac-
cord and satisfaction between the parties. 
2. That when the reinstatement of said promis-
sory note occurred, the deficiency judgment based 
thereon entered in the records of said Court on March 
10, 1966, became fully satisfied and of no force and 
effect, and in any e. ent it became inequitable for the 
same to have prospective application. 
3. That pursuant to Rule 60 (b) clause (6) d~ 
fendants are enti Ued to a declaration of the Court that 
the deficiency judgment entered on March 10, 1966, 
is fully satisfied and or no force and effed." 
By the Order the deficiency judgment taken about 
March 10, 1966, in the amount of $4,554.60 was declared 
satisfied and of no force and effect and the Court a'lllthor-
ized and directed the Clerk of this Court to enter upon the 
records of this Court in the above entitled matter a Satis-
faction of said Deficiency Judgment. 
Defendants failed to pay any sum after having the 
Deticic·ncy Judgment set aside and the declaration of :the 
Court that the Note and Mortgage was reinstated but d~ 
fe11dants stayed on the property. 
Plaintiff thereafter on December l, 1967, filed an 
Amended Complaint Which was considered by this Court. 
Defendants Answered said Amended COmplaint admitting 
Paragraph one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, and nine, 
and as to paragraph eight defendants put plaintiff on his 
Proof, but thereaiiter sHpulated that an Affidavit may be 
flied as to the amOllllt due and owing and further admit-
1in~; the necessity of incurring reasonable charges for 
sedrching the records but denying the balance of paragraph 
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ten and alliSwering paragraph 11 alleging that they are 
without sufficient infonnation to form a belief as to the 
truth or falsity of the allegations 1Jhereon, and upon that 
basis, denied the same. As a Third Defense defendants, 
Donald Gurney and Ireta F. Gurney, his wife, plead: 
"As a further and affirmative defense, defendant, 
Donald Gurney, alleges that he was duly adjudgad a 
bankrupt by the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah on a petition filed by him on Maroh 
7, 1967, and that the indebtedness sued upon herein 
has been duly scheduled for discharge, and will be 
discharged in due course.'' 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE WAS REINSTATED 
OCTOBER 24; 1967, BY THE ACT OF THE COURT. 
When the Decree of Foreclosure W8$ entered in this 
matter on December 23, 1965, andi tlhe Note reduced to 
Judgment (See Decree of Foreclosure filed December 23, 
1965, and Minute Entry of December 14, 1965) I 1Jhe orig-
inal Promissory Note as discharged and the instrument 
thereby extinguished. see lOC.J.S. Bills and Notes Sec-
tion 472, p. 1025, wherein it is stated: 
"If judgment is recovered on a bill or a note, the 
instrmnent is thereby extinguished as between plain-
tiff and defendant;" 
Ordinarily the cause of action sued on, the original 
Note and Mortgage, merged in the judgment rendered 
thereon and may not again be Utigated, this is discussed at 
50 C.J.S. Section. 599, p. 20-23, as follows: 
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"A claim or demand which is put in suit and pru&.°S 
to final judgment is merged or swallowed up in the 
judgment; and this rule applies to a final decree in a 
court of equity. The judgment extinguishes the orig-
inal cause of aotion, which loses its vitality and cannot 
thereafter be litigated, either as a cause of action or 
as a set-off or counterclaim, unless a statute otherwise 
provides, and the rights of the parties are governed by 
the judgment. Moreover, as a general rule all the pe-
culiar qualities of the claim are merged in the judg-
ment which then stands rn1 the same footing as all 
other judgments. 
The doctrine of merger has been variously stat.ed 
to be based on the principle that a superior right cov-
ers or absorbs an inferior right, and that a judgment 
is of a higher order of security than an ordinary cause 
of action, because it would be vexatious to the one par-
ty, and of no benefit to the other, to permit the recov-
ery of two judgments against the same person for one 
debt, and that it arises out of the quality of a judg-
ment which renders it conclusive, or because the orig-
inal matter, which was open to controversy, is defi-
nitely settled by the judgment. In order that a cause 
of action may be merged in a judgment it must be set 
up as a cause of action or as the basis for a judgment, 
and judgment must be rendered thereon. If the judg-
ment is valid, the holder's recovery should be on the 
judgment, but, if it is invalid, his recovery should be 
on the original cause of action. 
In general the doctrine of merger applies to all 
ca.uses of action, whether ex rontra<...1u or ex delicto, 
and al<;o where plaintiff has two or more alternative 
remedies for the same wrong and obtains a judgment 
with a limited form of relief. It includes CQIJltracts, 
bonds, notes, and causes of action on which judgment 
is rendered for or against an executor or administra-
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tor, but generally not a judgment om which a new judg-
ment is rerovered, as discussed supra Section 561. 
Limitation of doctrine. The doctrine of merger 
will not, however, be carried any fw·ther than the ends 
of justice require. The judgment docs not annihilate ! 
the debt..s, destroy its character as evidence, or change 
the essential nature and real fmmdation of the cause 
of action. It does not preclude all inquiry as to the 
character or nature of the original cause of action, or : 
an ascertainment of whether or not the claim is rrnlly 
one of a nature such as the court is authorized to en-
force; and, when the essential rights of tihe parties are 
influenced by the original contract, the court will look 
behind the judgment for the purpose of ascertaining 
what the original contract was. 
The judgment only changes the form of action , 
for recovery. The incidrnt of the old debt may be 
carried forward to prevent the inequitable destruction 
of a right, privilege or exemption. The creditor is not 
deprived by the judgment of his right to resort to a 
fund, or to avail himself of a lien or 'security held for 
the debt. The fact that, as a certain p€TS011S or prop-
erty, a debt or obligation is merged in a judgment 
thereon does not prevent it from remaining an effec· 
tive cause of action against other persons or property." , 
The new liability that is created is further discuSSed 
at 50 C.J.S., Section 600, p. 24, as follows: 
"As a general rule the recovery of a judgment cre-
ates a new debt or liability, distinct from the original 
claim or demand, and this new liability is not merely 
the evidence of the creditor's claim, but is thereafter 
the substance of the claim itself." 
Until the Court reinstated the Mortgage and set aside 
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the Judgment on October 24, 1967, the obligation was. in 
the form of the Judgment. The action of the Court at the 
request of defendants created a new obligation October 24, 
1967. 
Defendants by their Motion dated March 20, 1967, and 
filed March 22, 1967, askd for and obtained relief from the 
judgment of this Court under Rule 60 (b) Clause (6), see 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed in this mat-
ter October 24, 1967. Rule 60 (b) provides: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party 
Gr his legal repr2sentative.s from a final judgment, or-
der, or proceedings for the follorwing reasons . . . the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
rev~.csed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equi-
table that the judgment should have pro.3pective appli-
cation;" 
On the 24th day of October, 1967, the Court concluded: 
"2. That when the reinstatement of said promis-
sory note occurred, the deficiency judgment based 
thereon entered in the r€'.:nrds of said Court on March 
10, 1966, became fully satisfied and of no force and 
effect, and in any event it became inequitable for the 
same to have prospective application. 
3. That pursuant to Rule 60 (b) clause ( 6) de-
fendants are entitled to a declaration of the Court that 
the deficiency judgment entered on March 10, 1966, is 
fully satisfied and of no force and effect." (See Con-
clusions of Law signed on the 24th day of October, 
1967) 
The Court set aside the deficiency judgment and rein-
stated the obligation existing between the parties because 
10 
of an accord and satisfaction. See Minute Entry dated Oc-
tober 18, 1967. 
POINT II 
DEFENJDANT, DONALD GURNEY'S, CONDUCT IN 
THIS PROCEEDING IS TANT AMOUNT TO ACKNOWL-
EDGMENT OF TIIE DEBT AND AGREEMENT TO PAY 
TIIE SAME. 
Defendant has obtained and taken advantage of a de-
lay because of Defendant's affirmative action. 
Williston on Contracts revised addition Volume SLx, 
Section 1844-1845 d.i,scusses the problem as follows: 
"It is clear that the debtor has just reason to com-
plain if .the law allows the creditor to proceed at once 
with his original cause of action without giving the 
debtor an opportunity to satisfy it as the parties agreed 
in the accord. Recognized principles, however, suf-
fice to protect the debtor. His grievance is that the 
creditor has broken the promise of temporary forbear-
ance necessarily implied from the accord, and he should 
be entitled to the same redress that is allowed for 
breach of contracts for temporary forberu•ance where 
there is no agreement of accord. A covenant or at:her 
contract for temporary forbearance is not a good plea 
at law to an action brought in violation of the contract. 
if the maxim of the common law is sustained, as it usu-
ally has been, that a cause of action once suspended 
after it has arisen is permanently gone. Thus, as has 
been previously pointed out, an unexecuted agreement 
of accord for the settlement at a future day of the 
principal's debt has been held not to discharge the sur· 
ety, on ·the ground that the accord docs not suspend 
the right of action. Some decisions, however, find no 
difficulty in allowing the defense at law, and there 
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seems no intrinsic reason why the procedure of a court 
at law should be inadequate for the pwpose of giving 
a temporary suspension of the action. If, however, 
the plea is held bad as a legal defense, the facts afford 
no better ground for an equitable plea to the action, 
since equity would not grant a permanent injt.m.ction 
against the creditor's action, and, therefore, the same 
difficulty that forbids upholding the plea as a legal 
defense is equally insuperable to an equitable defense. 
The defendant is entitled to delay not to a defense on 
th merits, and, relief not being obtainable at law, he 
must apply to a cou:M. of equity powers for a tempo.-
racy injunction against the prosecution of the action, 
and such an injunction should be granted. 
In 1Jhe case of an accord there is a further diffi-
culty. It will not greatly help the debtor to get a tem-
porary injunction on the exp~ or implied promise 
of the creditor to forbear if 1Jhe creditor is permitted 
ultimately to refuse to accept the agreed satisfaction, 
and then to enforce his original cause of action. In 
order to give effectual relief, therefore, equity must 
specifically enforce the performance of the accord. As 
a court of law cannot give adequate relief, and as the 
Promise of temporary forbearance neceBUily included 
in the accord gives equity jurisdiction of the matter, 
there seems good reason for equity to deal with the 
whole matter by granting specific performance. 
Though ,1Jhere is strangely little authority urpon the 
matter, and though in the few cases on the point the 
reasoning is not very full or satisfactory, the result -
here advocated seems to be justified by the decisions." 
The Restatement of the Law, Contracts, discusses the 
Probbm as follows: 
"TOPIC 9. DISCHARGE BY ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION. 
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Section 417. An Aiecord; Its Effect; When Per. 
formed And ,When Broken. 
Except as stated in Section 142, 143 with refer. 
ence to contracts for the benefit of third persons and 
as stated in Section 418, the following rules are appli. 
ca.Ible to a contract to accept in the future a stated per. 
formance in satisfaction of an existing contractual du-
ty, or a duty to make compensation: 
a. Such a contract does not disicharge the duty, 
but suspends the right to enforce it as long ~ 
there has been neither a breach of the contract 
nor a justification for the creditor in changing his 
position because of its prospective non perform· 
ance. 
b. If such a contract is performed, the previously 
existing duty is discharged. 
c. If the debtor breaks such a contraict the cred-
itor has alternative rights. He can enforce either 
the original duty or the subsequent contract. 
d. If the creditor breaks such a contract, the 
debtor's original duty is not discharged. The 
The debtor acquired a right of action for damage-.; 
for the breach, and if sipecific enforo2ment of that 
contract is practicable, he acquired an alternative 
right to the specific enforcement thereof. If the 
contract is enforced specifically, his original duty 
is discharged . . . . 
illustrations of Cla~ (d): 
4. A owes B $1000.00. They contract that 
in settlement, A shall deliver to B a specific auto-
mobile on August 1. Tl1e automobil~ is of an or· 
dinary make and a similar one is obtainable vn 
the market. A tenders the machine on that da;, 
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burt. B refuses to receive it. If B thereafter sues 
A for the original debt, A can sue or counterclaim 
for the damages suffered by the refusal of B to 
accept the machine in satisfaction of his claim; 
or A can obtain a decree of specific enforcement 
providing for the concurrent delivery of the ma-
chine and discharge of the debt. 
5. A owes B an unliquidated matured debt. 
They contract that as settlement A shall pay B 
$100.00 on the first day of August following. A 
tenders the money on that day but B refuses to 
receive it. If B thereafter sues A for the orig-
inal debt, A can sue or counterclaim for the dam-
ages suffered by B's refusal or A can obtain a de-
cree of specific enforcement, requiring the concur-
rent payment of $100.00 by A and the discharge 
of .fue original debt by B." 
The Bankruptcy Act does not provide for the revival 
of discharged debts, this~ governed by State Law, which 
Wliformly holds that the bar of a discharge may be waived 
by a new promise. Collier Bankruptcy Manual, Section 
17.13. 
Generally it is not necessary that rtlhe new promise 1be 
in writing although a written promise is sometimes required 
by local statute. Collier Bankruptcy Manual, Section 17.13. 
The general rule is that the promise of a bankrupt to 
pay the debt in question is binding whether the promise 
is made after the filing of the petition and before the dis-
charge, or sUJbsequent to the discharge. Collier Bank-
ruptcy Manual, Section 17.13. 
California in a recent case, Davidson, et we., vs. An· 
derson, et al., 271 P.2d 233, decided June 9, 1965, had oc-
14 
casion to examine an acknowledgment of the debt and an 
agreement to pay it. The fact situation wa,s as follows: 
"The respondent was adjudged a bankrupt on July 
26, 1951, and he was granted his discharge in bank-
ruptcy on April 11, 1952. On May 29, 1952, the a~ 
pellants were granted permission in the bankruptcy 
proceeding to institute the present action. This ac-
tion was commenced on September 10, 1952, by a rom-
plaint for foreclosure wherein the usual relief, includ-
ing a deficiency judgment, was prayed for by appel-
lants. On October 24, 1952, respondent filed his ans-
wer. The answer was, for all practical purposes, a 
general denial, the matter of bankruptcy was not be-
ing mentioned in it. On February 2, 1953, the ca;;e 
was called for trial, and the respondent then stipulated 
without re;servation that judgment might be entered 
against him. On March 20, 1953, judgment was en-
tered against respondent granting appellants all relief 
asked for in the complaint, including the right to seek 
a deficiency judgment. A foreclosure sale was then 
had in accordance with the judgment, and a return on 
the sale was made to the trial court. The appellants 
thereafter sought and obtained a deficiency judgment 
against the respondent on August 6, 1953. The re-
spondent has notice of all these proceedings, but made 
no objection to them prior to filing the proceedings out 
of which this appeal grows. On August 20. 1953. re-
spondent filed the instant proceeding seeking his dis· 
charge from the judgment under the provisions of Sec· 
tion 675b of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the trial 
Court granted his motion of February 15, 1964. This 
appeal followed." 
The Court stated: 
"Obviously, the judgment in this case was not dis-
charged by respondent's discharge in bankruptcy, for 
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the action upon which it is founded was not com-
menced until after the respondent had been granted 
hi:; discharge in bankruptcy. The sole question, then, 
is whether the debt upon which the judgment is foun-
ded was discharged, and if so, whether the judgment 
itself must therefore fall. The record indicates that 
the debt was discharged, but under the peculiar facts 
of this case, the respondent can obtain no comfort from 
that fact, for he stipulated that judgment might be 
entered against him on this debt after he had received 
his discharge in bankruptcy. Hlis stipulation that 
judgment might be entered against him is tantamount 
to an acknowledgment of the debt, and an agreement 
to pay it. There was ample consideration for this 
new agreement, for even though the remedy to enforce 
the debt, discharged by fue proceedings in bankruptcy, 
was gone, the moral obligation to pay the debt re-
mained, and constituted sufficient consideration to 
support the new promise to pay. Civil Code, Sec 1606; 
12 Cal Jur. 2d 235; Lambert v. Sohmalz, 118 Cal. 33, 
50 P. 13. Furthermore, a stipulation for a judgment 
is a consent to the entry of the judgment and is a wai-
ver of errors by the party consenting thereto. Such 
a judgment so entered will not be disturbed on appeal. 
Morrow v. Learned, 76 Cal.App 538, 245 P. 442; 13 
Cal.Jur. 878 . . . . 
... No authority has been called to our attention and 
we are unable to find any authority, which holds that 
a bankrupt debtor may appear in an action brought 
by his creditor on a discharged debt, stipulate for judg-
ment, and then, after the judgment has been entered 
on his stipulation, seek relief under the provisions of 
Sec. 675b of the Code of Civil Procedure. There are 
a host of cases holding that if a debtor fails to affirm-
atively plead the bar of his discharge in bankruptcy 
and the case goes to judgment, he has waived his right 
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to that defense. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lipscomb, 
40 Cal.App. 2d 171, 104 P.2d 525; Harrell v. Hoag. 1 
land, 18 Cal. App. 2d 721, 64 P.2d 953; Holmes v. Jus-
tice Court, 19 Cal.App. 2d 362, 65 P.2d 820; Tuttle v. 
Scott, 119 Cal. 586, 51 P. 849. We do not think the 
rule should be otheirwise in situations such as we now 
have before us. We think that any bankrupt debtor 
who actually appears in an action on a debt claimed 
by him to be di,wharged in bankruptcy must plead 
that defense in the action, and if he fails to do so, he 
waives his right to claim relief under Code of Civil Pro-
cedure Sec. 675b. Any other rule would allow the 
bankrupt debtor to lure his creditor into the expendi-
ture of needless time, effort and money, to trifle with 
the Court, and to needlessly take up time of all con· 
cemed, only to have him defeat the claim by the iden· 
tical defense that he could have raised long before in 
the very same proceeding. This, we believe, would 
be a travesty on jl.1$tice and common sense dictates 
that it should not be permitted." 
CONCLUSION 
That there was affirmative relief in this case granted 
by the Court on the 24th day of October, 1967, which at 
the request of defendants reinstated the Note and Mortgage 
which had been previously discharged by the judgment 
at the request of the defendants and defendants acknowl· 
edged the debt and promised to pay the same. 
Defendants' action asking for affirmative relief in set· 
ting aside the deficiency judgment and maintaining pos· 
session of the real property since December 23, 1965, when 
the judgment was originally entered and failing to mention 
his bankruptcy in said motion for affirmative relief is tan· 
tamount to admowledgment of the debt, and agreement 
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to pay it. That there was ample oonsideration for this 
new agreement, for even though the remedy to enforce the 
debt discharged by the proceedings in bankruptcy, W8$ 
gone, the moral obligation to pay the debt remained and 
constituted sufficient consideration to support the new 
promise to pay. 
Defendants asked for and received as Williston states 
it a delay not on a defense on the merits. Defendant's, Don-
ald Gurney's, conduct is tantamount to an acknowledgment 
of the debt 'and an agreement to pay it, otherwise, defend-
ant, Donald Gurney, is trifling with tlle Court as stated in 
Davidson vs. Anderson, heretofore referred to. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY H. IVIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
48 NortJh University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
